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The simple, really almost trivial, argument of the presentation at the seminar in Dagstuhl can be 
summarized in the following four statements.  
 
• Human-computer interaction (HCI) is a human action making use of computers.  
• This human action involves operations carried out by the computer. They appear to us as if 
the computer was also active (which in a way, it is).  
• The human and the computer are constantly taking turns in their action and operation and, 
therefore, we call this entire happening „interaction“.  
• Interactive use of the computer by necessity requires sensory perception and, 
consequentially, interpretation. Therefore, aesthetics must play an important role. This is so 
if we consider aesthetics as the study of sensory perception and understanding. 
 
„Making use of a computer“ really means, using software as if it was a machine. 
Nothing in the world, left alone without any human intervention, is true nor good nor beautiful. It is 
only through human judgment that layers of truth or goodness or beauty are generated. This may 
happen by three kinds of judgments: the logic, the ethic, and the aesthetic kind of judgment. So 
aesthetics is, first of all, a way of making judgments. In so far, it is relational. It is not so much about 
features and properties of things, but rather puts the human into a certain relation with the object 
under consideration. 
The aesthetic judgment discriminates at the sensory level but it possesses an innate tendency of 
going beyond the sensory domain (if it could really be separated and considered in splendid 
isolation). So in the aesthetic judgment, we have discrimination and valuation. Valuation is definitely 
different from evaluation: it is about qualities, whereas evaluation should usually result in quantity 
and, in fact, much research aims at this. 
The subject matter of aesthetics before valuation thus appears as human sensory perception. Since 
perception creates signs as representers of the objects and processes studied, we enter the field of 
semiotics. Perception becomes a component of semiosis, i.e. the start into a sign process. Sign 
processes are processes of interpretation and re-interpretation, essentially without end. Visual 
aesthetics has its subject matter reduced to the visual sensory mode. 
Until recently, usability was of great concern within the HCI community. It is not possible to 
seriously compare aesthetics to usability unless we destroy aesthetics to a sort of instrument. It may, 
however be justified to identify a few features of usability vs. aesthetics. To usability, the computer is 
like a tool; only in an environment of work activity does usability make sense; here we have tasks 
and immediate purposes and, therefore, prediction and measure; in general, usability is a matter of 
practical reason. 
To aesthetics, the computer is like a medium; it becomes important in game activities; decision 
making and values are guiding principles; and aesthetics is a matter of contemplative reason. 
As a general concept, I want to remind of software objects as algorithmic signs. These are signs 
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that allow for, and require two interpretants: the intentional and the causal interpretant. Algorithmic 
signs are perceivable (by us) and computable (by the computer). They connect the aesthetic with the 
algorithmic domain. They have, metaphorically speaking, a surface (our view) and a subface (the 
computer’s view). 
As a radically agnostic position, I view the world as the world and nothing else. It is the whole that 
some call „god“. We can have it in parts only. From a particular (sic!) perspective, the aesthetic 
perspective, e.g., the world appears as aesthetic signs, aesthetic processes, and aesthetic judgments. 
Since the aesthetic perspective is the perspective of perception, HCI has no choice but  turn to 
aesthetics in its attempt to better understand certain processes. 
HCI, in my view, is the weak coupling of two semiotic processes. One of them is a full-fledged sign 
process (on behalf of the human, happening on the surface). The other one is reduced to a signal 
process (on behalf of the computer, happening on the subface). Therefore, the (visual) aesthetics of 
HCI is the aesthetics of algorithmic signs as they appear in environments or situations of interaction. 
Questions of HCI must be tackled from here, i.e. from the dialectics of the new sign class, the 
algorithmic sign. The designer’s operations immediately appear on, and influence, the surface. 
Through the coupling of the two processes, the computer takes up what the designer does, and 
carries out the required operations. The result are changes on the subface. They appear visible as 
changes on the surface, due again to the coupling. In this mediated way, the designer can make use 
of the algorithmic side of the algorithmic sign.  
This new challenge for aesthetics is what HCI is about. It may be the case that my plea for a radical 
aesthetic turn in HCI is off the main orientation of experimental psychology if it is correct to consider 
experimental psychology as a kind of normal science (Thomas Kuhn) exploring quantitatively what 
aesthetics may have to offer. In that case I apologize for an intervention whose basis is design more 
than analysis. 
 
